

Traffic Monitoring and Diagnosis with Multivariate Statistical Network Monitoring: A Case Study

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


- ✓ Anomaly Detection from Traffic Data
 - ✓ Accuracy & Variate Sources
- ✓ Software for CyberSec:
 - ✓ Pivoting (**Specific**)
 - ✓ **High False Anomalies** (Correlation)
- ✓ CyberSec Research → ML
 - ✓ Data Fusion (**General**)
 - ✓ **High Detection** but **Semantic Gap**
- ✓ Multivariate Statistical Network Monitoring
 - ✓ Data Fusion (**General**)
 - ✓ **High Detection & Diagnosis**



Multivariate approach

In a data set with many measured variables, the interesting information is contained in a (much lower) number of **latent variables**

Multivariate Statistical Control (PCA)



Multivariate Network Security Monitoring (MSNM)

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PCA-based multivariate statistical network monitoring for anomaly detection



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2014 IEEE INFOCOM Workshops: 2014 IEEE INFOCOM Workshop on Security and Privacy in Big Data

Tackling the Big Data 4 Vs for Anomaly Detection

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Perspective

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Networkmetrics: multivariate big data analysis in the context of the internet

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Hierarchical PCA-Based Multivariate Statistical Network Monitoring for Anomaly Detection

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
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In all areas of knowledge. In chemistry and related disciplines, the chemometric comfort to understand and solve problems mainly from a multivariate and exploratory indeed, of broader applicability, even in areas of knowledge far from chemistry. In the context of the Internet, the net: the net of devices that allow an interconnected world where all types of data communication services can be provided. Problems in the Internet or in general in from chemometric problems. Building on this parallelism, we review four classes of on, anomaly detection, optimization, and classification. We present an illustrative multivariate perspective may lead to significant improvements from state-of-the-art letter name, we call the approach of treating these problems from that multivariate-networkmetric problems have their own specificities, mainly, their typical Big Data structured data. We argue that multivariate analysis is, indeed, useful to tackle these in Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Working; networkmetrics; Big Data

2016 IEEE International Workshop on Information Forensics and Security (WIFS)

- ✓ MSNM: 5 steps from the hay to the needle



(1) Parsing

(2) Fusion

(3) Detection

(4) Diagnosis

(5) De-parsing

(1) Parsing: Feature-as-a-counter

```

<![LOG[      SCCM.CONTOSO.COM]LOG!]> <time="21:36:59.151+000" date="03-30-2010" component="ccmsetup" context="" type="1" thread="4304"
file="ccmsetup.cpp:4542">
<![LOG[Updated security on object C:\Windows\ccmsetup\,]LOG!]> <time="21:36:59.167+000" date="03-30-2010" component="ccmsetup" context=""
type="0" thread="4304" file="ccmsetup.cpp:8849">
<![LOG[Sending Fallback Status Point message, STATEID='100'.]LOG!]> <time="21:36:59.183+000" date="03-30-2010" component="ccmsetup" context=""
type="1" thread="4304" file="ccmsetup.cpp:9326">
<![LOG[State message with TopicType 800 and TopicId {9EBF02F2-54F8-4E7E-8CC1-6982AC49CD98} has been sent to the FSP]LOG!
> <time="21:36:59.370+000" date="03-30-2010" component="FSPStateMessage" context="" type="1" thread="4304" file="fsputilib.cpp:730">
<![LOG[Running as user "SYSTEM"]LOG!]> <time="21:36:59.370+000" date="03-30-2010" component="ccmsetup" context="" type="1" thread="2928"
file="ccmsetup.cpp:2690">
<![LOG[Detected 16747 MB free disk space on system drive,]LOG!]> <time="21:36:59.370+000" date="03-30-2010" component="ccmsetup" context=""
type="1" thread="2928" file="ccmsetup.cpp:463">
  
```

c_ccmsetup=5




| Time | FSPStateMessage | ccmstup | thread_4304 |
|-------|-----------------|---------|-------------|
| T=20s | 1 | 5 | 4 |
| T=40s | 2 | 3 | 3 |
| T=60s | 1 | 3 | 3 |
| T=80s | 1 | 1 | 4 |


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Tackling the Big Data 4 Vs for Anomaly Detection

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




Combine any sources: from low level sensors (e.g. netflow) to high level info (e.g. correlation rules at SIEM)




$$D_n = \sum_{a=1}^A \left(\frac{t_{an} - \mu_{t_a}}{\sigma_{t_a}} \right)^2$$


$$Q_n = \sum_{m=1}^M (e_{nm})^2$$



(4) Diagnosis



When?



Where?

```

IDS-03292012-1hr.txt
[**] [1:2103003:7] GPL NETBIOS SMB-DS Session Setup NTLMSSP unicode asnl overflow attempt [**]
[Classification: Generic Protocol Command Decode] [Priority: 3]
03/29-14:48:31.019982 172.23.0.216:1251 -> 172.23.0.10:445
TCP TTL:128 TOS:0x0 ID:1696 IpLen:20 DgmLen:1500 DF
***A**** Seq: 0xA9B345B0 Ack: 0x4522D27D Win: 0xFF3A TcpLen: 20
[Xref => http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/MS04-007.mspx][Xref =>
http://cgi.nessus.org/plugins/dump.php3?id=12065][Xref =>
http://cgi.nessus.org/plugins/dump.php3?id=12052][Xref =>
http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2003-0818][Xref =>
http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/9635][Xref => http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/9633]


[**] [1:2102466:9] GPL NETBIOS SMB-DS IPC$ unicode share access [**]
[Classification: Generic Protocol Command Decode] [Priority: 3]
03/29-14:48:31.024896 172.23.0.216:1251 -> 172.23.0.10:445
TCP TTL:128 TOS:0x0 ID:1698 IpLen:20 DgmLen:138 DF
***AP*** Seq: 0xA9B35020 Ack: 0x4522D402 Win: 0xFDB5 TcpLen: 20

[**] [1:2103003:7] GPL NETBIOS SMB-DS Session Setup NTLMSSP unicode asnl overflow attempt [**]
[Classification: Generic Protocol Command Decode] [Priority: 3]
03/29-14:48:32.421373 172.23.0.211:1308 -> 172.23.0.10:445
TCP TTL:128 TOS:0x0 ID:1843 IpLen:20 DgmLen:1500 DF
***A**** Seq: 0xA1B4DB42 Ack: 0x5D2556D8 Win: 0xFF3A TcpLen: 20
[Xref => http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/MS04-007.mspx][Xref =>
http://cgi.nessus.org/plugins/dump.php3?id=12065][Xref =>
http://cgi.nessus.org/plugins/dump.php3?id=12052][Xref =>
http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2003-0818][Xref =>
http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/9635][Xref => http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/9633]
    
```

(5) De-parsing

Logs with detailed info of the anomaly are manually identified from the information provided by MSNM





- ✓ Synthetic attacks: DoS, scan, exfiltration (3 types)





TABLE IV
FEATURES OF THE CALIBRATION AND THE TEST SETS.

| Feature | Calibration | Test |
|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| Capture start | 10:52h 03/18/2016 | 13:43h 07/27/2016 |
| Capture end | 18:27h 06/26/2016 | 09:27h 08/29/2016 |
| Attacks start | N/A | 00:00h 07/28/2016 |
| Attacks end | N/A | 12:00h 08/09/2016 |
| Number of files | 17 | 6 |
| Size (compressed) | 181GB | 55GB |
| # Connections | ≈ 13,000M | ≈ 3,900M |



✓ Features (138, no Fusion)

| Variable | #features → values |
|------------------|---|
| Source IP | 2 → <i>public, private</i> |
| Destination IP | 2 → <i>public, private</i> |
| Source port | 50 → <i>specific services, Other</i> |
| Destination port | 50 → <i>specific services, Other</i> |
| Protocol | 5 → <i>TCP, UDP, ICMP, IGMP, Other</i> |
| Flags | 6 → <i>A, S, F, R, P, U</i> |
| ToS | 3 → <i>0, 192, Other</i> |
| # Packets in | 5 → <i>very low, low, medium, high, very high</i> |
| # Packets out | 5 → <i>very low, low, medium, high, very high</i> |
| # Bytes in | 5 → <i>very low, low, medium, high, very high</i> |
| # Bytes out | 5 → <i>very low, low, medium, high, very high</i> |

Tackling the Big Data 4 Vs for Anomaly Detection



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
✓ One-class SVM

- ✓ B. Scholkopf, A. J. Smola, R. C. Williamson, and P. L. Bartlett, “New Support Vector Algorithms,” *Neural computation*, vol. 12, no. 5, pp.1207–1245, 2000.
- ✓ B. Scholkopf, J. C. Platt, J. Shawe-Taylor, A. J. Smola, and R. C. Williamson, “Estimating the Support of a High-Dimensional Distribution,” *Neural Computation*, vol. 13, no. 7, pp. 1443–1471, 2001.


✓ Synthetic attacks




✓ Real attacks: Detection scores



- 20 Top detections
- Top & Synth.
- △ Least agreement



✓ Real attacks: Diagnosis



```

Time interval 20160806t2039-20160807t0559
'dport_smtp' 'in_nbytes_low' 'tcpflags_SYN' 'protocol_tcp'
'tcpflags_PSH' 'in_npackets_low' '--protocol_udp' '--dport_dns'
'tcpflags_RST' 'srcos_zero'
  
```

Many SMTP short connections

Advantage over ML

Diagnosis is useful, but too complicated!

✓ Real attacks: De-parsing example

```
Time interval 20160806t2039-20160807t0559
'dport_smtp' 'in_nbytes_low' tcpflags_SYN' 'protocol_tcp'
'tcpflags_PSH' 'in_npackets_low' '--protocol_udp' '--dport_dns'
'tcpflags_RST' 'srctos_zero'
```

```
MSNM rocks :- ) $ nfdump -R $inputs -t 2016/08/06.20:39:00-2016/08/07.06:00:00
'dst port = 25 or (bytes > 150 and bytes < 1001) ... ' -w $output
```


MSNM rocks :-) \$ nfdump -r \$output -s dstport:p/packets -n 5

Top 5 Dst Port ordered by packets: SPAM campaing


| Date first seen | Duration | Proto | Dst Port | Flows(%) | Packets(%) |
|-------------------------|-----------|-------|----------|--------------|---------------|
| 2016-08-06 20:39:01.448 | 33657.436 | GRE | 0 | 16537(0.1) | 170.8 M(31.0) |
| 2016-08-06 20:40:21.164 | 33579.712 | TCP | 25 | 11.5 M(38.2) | 72.0 M(13.1) |
| 2016-08-06 20:39:02.756 | 33658.236 | TCP | 443 | 1.4 M(4.6) | 45.6 M(8.3) |
| 2016-08-06 20:39:08.644 | 33652.352 | TCP | 80 | 1.5 M(4.9) | 45.1 M(8.2) |
| 2016-08-06 21:00:20.876 | 27042.808 | TCP | 20 | 109(0.0) | 25.9 M(4.7) |

Top 5 Dst Port ordered by packets: Normal

| Date first seen | Duration | Proto | Dst Port | Flows(%) | Packets(%) |
|-------------------------|----------|-------|----------|-------------|--------------|
| 2016-08-20 11:07:01.452 | 895.896 | GRE | 0 | 378(0.1) | 2.0 M(25.6) |
| 2016-08-20 11:07:27.128 | 869.912 | TCP | 80 | 32569(9.5) | 1.0 M(12.8) |
| 2016-08-20 11:07:27.116 | 870.680 | TCP | 443 | 26252(7.6) | 633500(7.9) |
| 2016-08-20 11:11:27.008 | 583.996 | TCP | 26242 | 4(0.0) | 590509(7.4) |
| 2016-08-20 11:07:01.000 | 888.752 | TCP | 22 | 898(0.3) | 505988(6.3) |



(a) Calibration Set



(b) Test Set

- ✓ MSNM ~ OCSVM in detection.
- ✓ Good detection performance when including real attacks.
- ✓ MSNM has diagnosis support → reduces the time from detection to response.
- ✓ Unlike other methods, MSNM takes advantage of a large number of features → improves Diagnosis
- ✓ Future work:
 - ✓ Other sources (Host), MSNM-SIEM, Privacy & Scalability, ...

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